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This Comment deals with ugly and destructive instances of
physical abuse and sexual molestation of children that occur in a
setting that is supposed to be a sanctuary of safety and nurturance-
the public school. Although the victims of these abuses have legal
claims against the perpetrators of these destructive activities-be
they teachers, school employees, or fellow students-they also have
claims against school officials I and school districts, under whose
watch these incidents occur. These latter claims are the subject of
this Comment. Many such claims are brought under state tort law,
2
but this Comment examines liability for "constitutional torts"-
federal statutory-based liability under Section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871l.
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I would like to thank Erica and Evan Dody for selflessly allowing me to write the first
draft of this Comment in their playroom. I also thank Professors Ralph Smith and
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse for their advice, and Tony Kapper for his keen editorial
insight. I am grateful to Susan Sciarratta for her quiet encouragement, and I dedicate
this Comment, with love and respect, to my parents.
1 As used in this Comment, this includes principals, school board members, and
superintendents.
2 See Smith v. School Admin. Dist. No. 58, 582 A.2d 247 (Me. 1990) (involving an
action brought by a student and her parents against a school district for injuries
sustained by the student on a school playground); Gardner v. City of Biddeford, 565
A.2d 329 (Me. 1989) (involving a state tort law claim alleging unlawful sexual contact
with student); Logan v. City of New York, 543 N.Y.S.2d 661 (App. Div. 1989) (alleging
school's negligent supervision resulted in rape of student by another student); Medlin
v. Bass, 386 S.E.2d 80 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a school superintendent was
negligent in hiring a principal with a history of sexual assault).
3 Section 1983 in pertinent part provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
As a practical matter, there are a number of reasons why Section 1983 claims are
brought instead of, or in addition to, state tort law claims. First, a Section 1983
(471)
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Although Section 1983 liability can be established under two
theories, 4 this Comment concentrates solely on claims asserting that
public school officials and districts have an affirmative duty to
protect the student/victim from harm. Once the plaintiff establish-
es that the school officials and districts have such a duty, the
plaintiff must then prove that the school defendants breached that
action will guarantee access to federal court, which the plaintiff may prefer for
strategic reasons. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (providing federal court jurisdiction
in cases where a federal statutory question is presented in a well-pleaded complaint).
Second, under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1988), victorious Section 1983 plaintiffs are entitled, at the discretion of the court,
to have attorneys' fees and costs included in their award. Third, state law immunities
may bar certain actions that are not precluded under federal law. See e.g., Flores v.
Edinburg Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 554 F. Supp. 974, 978 (S.D. Tex. 1983) (noting
that while state immunity barred state law relief, plaintiff could bring a Section 1983
action). Finally, some states, like Wisconsin, statutorily cap damage awards in tort
cases against subdivisions of the state, whereas Section 1983 claims are not capped.
See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 893.80(3) (West 1983) ($50,000 limit). See generally William D.
Valente, Liability for Teacher's Sexual Misconduct with Students-Closing and Opening
Vistas, 74 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 1021, 1022 n.4 (1992) (listing advantages of Section
1983 actions as opposed to state law claims); Steven F. Huefner, Note, Affirmative
Duties in the Public Schools After DeShaney, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1940, 1961 (1990)
(discussing the additional protection Section 1983 provides as compared to state tort
remedies).
While a complete description of who can be named as a defendant in a Section
1983 suit is beyond the scope of this Comment, a brief explanation may be helpful.
In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Supreme Court held that local
governments, including school boards, were not subject to suit under Section 1983.
A 1978 opinion, Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), reversed
this holding and decided that "local governments" do count as "persons" under the
statute. Id. at 690. Additionally, the Monell court held that local government officials
sued in their official capacity are "persons" and are subject to Section 1983 actions
in the same manner as local municipalities. Id. at 700.
The Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court against states. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XI ("[T]heJudicial Power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States.... ."). Most school boards or school districts, however, are considered
local governmental bodies, not arms of the state and thus can be sued in federal
court. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In some
states, however, a suit directly against a school board will be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch.
Dist., 963 F.2d 248 (9th Cir. 1992), stated that "California has selected a different
path from that of most states. California has vested control of school funding in the
state rather than local governments." Id. at 254. A determinative factor in the
decision was the fact that school boards in California, unlike most school boards, do
not derive their funding mainly through local property taxes. See id. For a complete
discussion of Section 1983 actions, see generally SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS
AND CIvIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (3d ed. 1991).
4 See infra text accompanying notes 14-18 (discussing the custom/policy theory of
liability as well as the affirmative duty theory).
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duty by acting with "deliberate indifference" toward the injurious
behavior.5 This is a higher standard than ordinary negligence.
6
Part I of this Comment describes the general notion of liability
for inaction and the circumstances in which courts will impose
affirmative duties on the state. Part I then discusses DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services7 -the Supreme
Court's most important pronouncement on this point-and the
ambiguity left in its wake. While DeShaney itself deals with the
question of when a social service agency incurs an affirmative duty,
the doctrine announced by the Court in that case has been used to
analyze whether courts should impose such a duty in the public
school setting.
Part II examines how the ambiguity in DeShaney has led to
conflicting lower court opinions on whether public school officials
and districts have an affirmative duty to protect students from
harm. Two recent decisions on this point reveal a "split in the
circuits" on this issue.
8
5 The "deliberate indifference" standard derives from Eighth Amendment prisoner
cases. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,104-06 (1976) (holding that "deliberate
indifference" to a prisoner's serious medical needs must be proven in a Section 1983
claim). While the issue of what constitutes "deliberate indifference" is not the focus
of this Comment, the Seventh Circuit's explanation of the term may be helpful:
[Deliberate indifference may be] evidenced by either actual intent or
reckless disregard. Although the term "actual intent" is self-explanatory,
reckless disregard is not. A defendant acts recklessly when he disregards a
substantial risk of danger that either is known to him or would be apparent
to a reasonable person in his position. Recklessness is characterized by
highly unreasonable conduct or a gross departure from ordinary care in a
situation where a high degree of danger is apparent. The standard is an
objective one. Although subjective unawareness of the risk is no defense,
the risk must be foreseeable. Indeed, risk is defined as a recognizable
danger of injury. The risk also must be substantial.
Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted); see also City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,388 (1989) (holding that "deliberate indifference" on
the art of the state is necessary to establish a Section 1983 violation).
eIt is well established that the standard to demonstrate such a breach in a Section
1983 claim is one which is higher than ordinary negligence. See Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986) (noting that mere negligence cannot "give rise to a due
process 'deprivation'"). It should also be noted that some courts have cast the
standard as one of "gross negligence." See Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal Court,
820 F.2d 194, 199-200 (6th Cir. 1987).
7 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
'The two cases are the Third Circuit's decision in D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area
Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that the
school district and school officials had no affirmative duty to protect its students from
sexual abuse by classmates), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993) and the Fifth Circuit's
opinion in Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that
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Part III looks beyond the courts' categorical approach g to
determining when an affirmative duty should be imposed upon the
state, and analyzes the underlying principle of vulnerability that
drives the affirmative duty doctrine. Based on this principle, Part
III suggests an appropriate standard for determining when, as a
general matter, the state should incur an affirmative duty.
Finally, in Part IV, a middle ground on the question of affirma-
tive duty in the public school context is suggested. The lower
federal courts thus far have adopted an "all or nothing" approach
to this issue. They have ruled either that school districts and
officials never have an affirmative duty to protect students from
harm, or alternatively, that the school defendants should always be
held to such a duty.1 0 This Comment suggests, instead, that a
court reluctant to expand the scope of affirmative duties should
hold that public school officials and districts have an affirmative
duty to protect students from abuse or molestation when it is
perpetrated by teachers or school employees. In so ruling, a court would
not necessarily be deciding that the school defendants have an
affirmative duty in cases of abuse of students by other students.
As will be shown, this approach is consistent with the underlying
principle of vulnerability discussed in Part III. Importantly, it leaves
open the possibility of recovery for at least those students who are
abused by teachers or school employees in jurisdictions that might
otherwise completely foreclose liability for inaction in the public
school setting.
I. SECTION 1983 LIABILITY FOR INACTION AND
THE DFSHANEY DOCTRINE
In order to establish a claim under Section 1983, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that she was deprived, under color of state law,
superintendent and principal had an affirmative, constitutionally-based duty to protect
student from sexual abuse by a teacher/coach in her high school), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1066, reh'g granted, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993).
9 For a discussion of the courts' use of categorizing the factual content of cases
(e.g., prisons, psychiatric hospitals, foster care) to determine whether an affirmative
duty exists, see infra text accompanying notes 37-42.
10 By stating that the school defendants "should always be held to such a duty,"
it is not meant that whenever a student is injured at school, the school district or
school officials will be liable. Even if the duty always exists, liability is incurred only
when that duty has been breached by deliberately indifferent behavior on the part of
the school defendants.
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of some existing federal right.1 1 In the cases considered herein,
the underlying federal right is rooted in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.1 2 Courts couch the right to be free
from physical abuse or sexual molestation in terms of the constitu-
tional right to bodily security. Generally, courts have accepted this
as a sufficient and appropriate basis for these claims.
13
Having established the underlying constitutional right, plaintiffs
base their Section 1983 claims against school officials or districts on
one of two theories.1 4 Under one approach, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the school defendants instituted a custom,
practice, or policy "that condones or encourages" the mistreatment
of students.1 5 The burden of proving that an official custom or
11 See supra note 3.
12 The Due Process Clause provides, in relevant part, that no State shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
IS The constitutional right to be free from physical or sexual abuse in school was
recognized in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) ("Among the historic
liberties so protected [by the Due Process Clause] was a right to be free from, and to
obtain judicial relief for, unjustified intrusions on personal security."); see also White
v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 1979) (recognizing protection of the right
to bodily security); William D. Valente, School District and Official Liability for Teacher
Sexual Abuse of Students Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 57 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 645, 646 n.7
(1990) (citing Ingraham and Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 856 F.2d 599 (3d.
Cir. 1988), as support for the proposition that there is a substantive constitutional
right to be free from sexual abuse). For a detailed explanation of the contours of the
underlying constitutional deprivation in cases of abuse and molestation of children
in school, see Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 141-48 (5th Cir. 1992),
cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066, rehg granted, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993).
14 See Elliot v. New Miami Bd. of Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818, 820 (S.D. Ohio 1992)
("Courts... have considered § 1983 liability for public schools which have failed to
take action to protect a student based upon two theories: (1) constitutional duty
analysis; and (2) policy, custom or practice analysis."). It should be noted that Section
1983 clearly does not impose vicarious liability on school districts and school officials.
The Supreme Court, in Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978), unambiguously declared that
the language of § 1983, read against the background of the... legislative
history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend municipalities
to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some
nature caused a constitutional tort. In particular, we conclude that a
municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor-or,
in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a
respondeat superior theory.
Id. at 691. Thus, in claims where the plaintiff has been abused or molested by a
teacher or school employee, Section 1983 does not allow an agency-based theory of
liability upon the school district.
15 See Elliot, 799 F. Supp. at 823; see also Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91 (holding that
Section 1983 suits against local governmental bodies are permissible if it can be
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policy is sufficiently related to the abuse or molestation is often
difficult.1 6 A written policy indicating official failure to guard
against mistreatment of students in the school rarely exists. Cases
alleging that the policy or custom "ha[s] been manifested only by
... [a] pattern of action," as opposed to a written document, are
even more difficult to prove.
17
The concern of this Comment is not with the custom/policy
approach, but with the affirmative duty theory. A plaintiff may
establish Section 1983 liability by demonstrating that the defendants
"had a duty to take affirmative steps to protect the plaintiffs liberty
interests."
18
It is well established that the state has no obligation to take
affirmative action to protect any citizen from harm, just as it is
generally accepted in the common law of torts that no citizen has a
duty to "rescue," or come to the aid of, any other citizen.19 The
shown that the violation of a federal right was pursuant to a custom or policy).
16 In the context of abuse or molestation in the schools, the officials' inadequate
investigation is the policy or custom that the plaintiff alleges caused the violation of
constitutional rights. See D.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1188
(10th Cir. 1990) ("The School District could be held liable in this case under § 1983
only if plaintiffs demonstrated a direct causal connection between the hiring,
investigative, and supervising policy in question and the alleged constitutional
deprivation." (citation omitted)).
The Supreme Court has taken astringent view of the proof necessary to establish
causation.
[Adopting] lesser standards of fault and causation would open municipalities
to unprecedented liability under § 1983. In virtually every instance where
a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a city employee,
a § 1983 plaintiff will be able to point to something the city "could have
done" to prevent the unfortunate incident.
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391-92 (1989); see also Barbara Kritchevsky,
'Or Causes to be Subjected": The Role of Causation in Section 1983 Municipal Liability
Analysis, 35 UCLA L. REv. 1187 (1988) (noting that the Supreme Court has not fully
explained how policies or customs must be causally linked to a violation in order for
liability to be imposed).
It may also be difficult to determine which public school superiors qualify as
'policymakers" for the school or school district. The question of who is authorized
to make policy or customs for a particular entity is often not a simple one. See City
of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988) (holding that simply because
decisions of certain supervisors are not subject to review does not mean these
supervisors have policymaking authority).
17 Valente, supra note 13, at 647.
18 Huefner, supra note 3, at 1941; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept.
of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191 (1989).
19 For some striking examples of the application of this doctrine, see Handiboe
v. McCarthy, 151 S.E.2d 905, 907 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (holding that the defendant had
no duty to rescue a child licensee drowning in a swimming pool); Osterlind v. Hill,
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only exception to the "no duty to rescue" rule arises when there is
a "special relationship" between the victim and the would-be
rescuer. In common-law tort, a special relationship arises in one of
four circumstances: (1) where the defendant acts affirmatively to
cause the peril faced by the plaintiff; (2) where the defendant
undertakes to rescue the plaintiff; (3) where the plaintiff and
defendant are in an appropriate "status" to one another (e.g.,
parent-child, landlord-tenant, etc.); and (4) where there is a
contractual relationship between the parties.
2 0
By contrast, under Section 1983, the determination of which
situations place the state in a "special relationship" with a citizen-
and thus confer an affirmative duty to protect a citizen-is governed
by constitutional interpretation and statutory construction. "[T]he
Supreme Court's most forceful-and perhaps most controversial-
statement yet about the limited circumstances in which the
government has affirmative duties ... to protect its citizens"
21
under Section 1983, is offered in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services. 
22
As ChiefJustice Rehnquist, who authored the majority opinion,
noted, "[t]he facts of [the DeShaney] case are undeniably tragic."
23
Melody and Randy DeShaney had a son, Joshua, in 1979. In 1980,
the couple divorced, and Mr. DeShaney was awarded custody of
Joshua. Mr. DeShaney remarried, and shortly thereafter divorced
again. His second wife contacted the police in 1982 and com-
plained that Mr. Deshaney "hit [Joshua], causing marks and [was] a
prime case for child abuse." 24 In January of 1983 Joshua was
admitted to a local hospital. He had multiple bruises and abrasions.
160 N.E. 301, 302 (Ohio 1928) (holding that defendant had no duty to rescue even
where defendant rented a canoe to the intoxicated plaintiff); Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d
343, 346 (Pa. 1959) (holding that defendant had no duty to rescue even where
defendant incited the plaintiff tojump into the water and then let him drown). This
point is also made vividly clear in many first-year law classes through the oft-told (but
fictitious) anecdote of the baby drowning in the lake as the Olympic swim team passes
by, sees the child, and does nothing. Many students are shocked to learn that the
skilled swimmers incur no liability for their inaction.
20 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56,
at 376-81 (5th ed. 1984); Amy Sinden, Comment, In Search ofAffirmative Duties Toward
Children Under a Post DeShaney Constitution, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 227, 236 (1990)
(discussing affirmative dudes in the child welfare agency context).
2' Huefner, supra note 3, at 1948 (footnote omitted).
22 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
23 Id. at 191.
24 Id. at 192 (alteration in original).
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The examining physician "suspected child abuse."2 5 He notified
the Department of Social Services (DSS), which obtained an order
from a local court, placing Joshua in the temporary custody of the
hospital. The DSS convened an ad hoc "Child Protection Team,"
including a pediatrician, a psychologist, and a lawyer, "to consider
Joshua's situation.... [T]he Team decided that there was insuffi-
cient evidence of child abuse to retain Joshua in the custody of the
court."
26
The Team did, however, enter into a voluntary agreement with
Randy DeShaney designed to protect Joshua. The agreement
provided that Mr. DeShaney would enroll Joshua in a preschool
program, that Mr. DeShaney would participate in counseling, and
that Mr. DeShaney's girlfriend would move out of the house.
27
Joshua was returned to his father's custody.
One month laterJoshua was back in the emergency room. The
DSS was again notified that Joshua had been injured, but again
concluded that there was no basis for action.
28
"For the next six months, [a DSS] caseworker made monthly
visits to the DeShaney home, during which she observed a number
of suspicious injuries on Joshua's head; she also noticed that he had
not been enrolled in school, and that the girlfriend had not moved
out." 2' The caseworker recorded these observations, but did
nothing else.30 In November 1983, Joshua was again treated for
injuries that were believed to be caused by child abuse and again
released to his father31 "On the caseworker's next two visits to
the DeShaney home, she was told thatJoshua was too ill to see her.
Still [the] DSS took no action."
3 2
"In March 1984, Randy DeShaney beat 4-year-old Joshua so
severely that he fell into a life-threatening coma.... Joshua did not
die, but he suffered brain damage so severe that he is expected to
spend the rest of his life confined to an institution .... "33
Joshua's mother filed a Section 1983 suit alleging that the DSS and
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rights by failing to intervene to protect him from harm about which
they knew or should have known.
3 4
The DeShaney Court's holding and its dicta on the issue of when
the state assumes an affirmative duty to protect its citizens are, at
least on the surface, quite sweeping. The opinion reiterated the
general rule that the state is not required to bear affirmative
duties, 5 unless a "special relationship" exists between the individu-
al and the state. The Court stated that this "special relationship" is
triggered only "when the State takes a person into its custody and
holds him there against his will."
3 6
The Court cited the Estelle-Youngberg3 7 line of cases to demon-
strate the type of situations where such custody exists. The Estelle-
Youngberg doctrine refers to the type of custody the state has over
involuntarily committed psychiatric patients and prisoners.3 8 The
Court conceded that the state has a "duty to assume some responsi-
bility for... [the] safety and general well-being" of prisoners and
the involuntarily committed.3 9
Superficially then, Deshaney seems to set out a clear, simple
requirement of "custody" that must be met before the state is held
to an affirmative duty to protect a citizen. Subsequent cases and
literature regarding DeShaney, however, have been quick to point
out that the case is not nearly as lucid as it might seem. While the
opinion clearly indicates that the state's relationship to prisoners
and the involuntarily committed is "custodial" and will be sufficient
to establish an affirmative duty, it does not explicitly state that such
conditions are necessary to trigger an affirmative duty. "Judicial at-
tempts to interpret DeShaney suggest that the question of which
citizen-state relationships will generate affirmative duties still lacks
a definitive answer."40 Essentially, the confusion emanates from
two aspects of the opinion: first, the "foster care footnote," and
second, the Estelle-Youngberg paradigm.
34 See id. at 191.
35 See id. at 195.
s Id. at 199-200 (emphasis added).
m See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (holding that the state has
a duty to provide minimal care and services to an involuntarily committed psychiatric
patient); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) (holding that the government has
an affirmative duty to provide needed medical care to incarcerated prisoners).
38 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200.
39 Id. at 200.
40 Huefner, supra note 3, at 1948.
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The DeShaney Court in a footnote commented that "[h]ad the
State by the affirmative exercise of its power removed Joshua from
free society and placed him in a foster home" where he was injured
or abused, an affirmative duty might be imposed upon the state's
foster care placement agency.41 A child placed in a foster home
selected by a state agency, however, is certainly not being held in
the "custody" of the state in any sense that approaches the total
incarceration found in prisons or psychiatric institutions. Thus, the
foster care footnote arguably vitiates any contention that DeShaney
limits affirmative duties only to the strict "custodial" settings of
prisons or institutions. Although the majority "express[ed] no view"
on whether the state had an affirmative duty to protect children in
foster homes since this was not directly at issue, it did leave open
the possibility that such a duty could be found.
42
Additionally, the Court, while superficially requiring "custody"
and mentioning prisoners and the involuntarily committed as
examples of such custody, did not explicitly state that the Estelle-
Youngberg contexts exhausted the range of "custodial" situations.
The opinion, in fact, offers no clear guidelines to determine if any
situation besides prisons or institutions could be deemed custodial.
This ambiguity, like the foster care footnote, has been a source of
much confusion in attempts to interpret and apply DeShaney. Thus,
DeShaney, while at first blush appearing to settle the issue, actually
left open the question of what contexts trigger an affirmative duty.
II. AFFRMATwE DUTY IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS AFTER DESHANEY:
THE FRACTURED APPROACH IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
Since the Supreme Court's somewhat murky decision in
DeShaney, the lower federal courts have struggled to apply its
doctrine in suits against public school officials and districts for their
inaction. These cases invariably involve disturbing incidents of
physical or sexual abuse of children from pre-school through high
school, while in the supposedly secure environs of the public school.
Given the moral outrage that often accompanies a review of the
"excruciating factual context[s]" 43 in these cases, it is perhaps
unsurprising that much of the language in these opinions is strongly
41 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9. This footnote is conventionally recognized as the
foster care footnote.
42 Id.
43 D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1365 (3d
Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
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worded and often eloquent. Unfortunately, the confusion left in the
wake of DeShaney has not been overcome by judicial prose.
Accordingly, it has been observed that decisions on this issue have
resulted in an "unsettling mix of court reactions.
" 44
A. The Pagano Line of Cases
Since DeShaney, the lower federal courts have considered a
substantial number of cases that have specifically addressed the
issue of whether school officials and districts have an affirmative
duty to protect students from harm.45 Four decisions, Pagano v.
Massapequa Public Schools, 46 Robert G. v. Newburgh City School
District,4 7 Tilson v. School District,48 and Reeves v. Besonen,49 were
handed down on this issue shortly after DeShaney. They enunciate
4 Valente, supra note 3, at 1021.
45 See, e.g., DorothyJ. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., No. 92-2452, 1993 WL 406464 (8th
Cir. Oct. 13, 1993) (no duty); Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707 (3d Cir.
1993) (no duty); Maldonado v.Josey, 975 F.2d 727,732 (10th Cir. 1992) ("[W]e agree
with the Third and Seventh Circuits and conclude that compulsory attendance laws
do not create an affirmative constitutional duty to protect students. .. ."), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1266 (1993); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992)
(no duty), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066, reh'g granted, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993);
D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d at 1364 (no duty);
Bonacci v. King, No. 91-3849, 1992 WL 98293 (8th Cir. May 14, 1992) (no duty);J.O.
v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990) (no duty); D.T.
v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176 (10th Cir.) (found no deliberate
indifference so never dearly reached issue of affirmative duty), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
879 (1990); B.M.H. v. School Bd., No. CIVA.2: 92CV1221, 1993 WL 383559 (E.D. Va.
Sept. 23, 1993) (no duty); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., No. C-93-0123 EFL, 1993
WL 359872 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 1993) (no duty); Elliott v. New Miami Bd. of Educ.,
799 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (no duty); Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist., 784
F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ca.) (no duty), af'd, 981 F.2d 1263 (11th Cir. 1992); Waechter
v. School Dist. No. 14 030, 773 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Mich. 1991) (duty); Doe v.
Douglas County Sch. Dist. RE-i, 770 F. Supp. 591 (D. Colo. 1991) (no duty); Thames
v. Kimbrough, No. 91-C600, 1991 WL 86037 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 1991) (no duty);
Reeves v. Besonen, 754 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (no duty); Tilson v. School
Dist., CIV. A. No. 89-1923, 1990 WL 98932 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1990) (duty in dicta),
order aff'd, 932 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1991); Stauffer v. Orangeville Sch. Dist., No. 89-C-
20258, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19133 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 1990) (no duty); Robert G. v.
Newburgh City Sch. Dist., No. 89 CIV. 2978 (RPP), 1990 WL 3210 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8,
1990) (duty); Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(duty).
46 714 F. Supp. at 641.
47 No. 89 CIV. 2978 (RPP), 1990 WL 3210 (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 8, 1990).
48 CIV. A. No. 89-1923, 1990 WL 98932 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1990), order affd, 932
F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1991).
49 754 F. Supp. at 1135.
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the two basic arguments for finding that these school defendants
should be held to an affirmative duty.
The first argument is based on the "foster-care footnote" in
Deshaney. The argument goes that even if public school students are
not like prisoners or the involuntarily committed, they can be
analogized to children placed by the state into foster care. Since
DeShaney did not preclude an affirmative duty in the foster care
context, a duty should not be precluded in the public school
context. The second argument, the Fstelle-Youngberg analogy, holds
that the prison/institution context and the public school context are
analogous and that an affirmative duty should be present in both of
these cases. Because the state forces the individual into a psychiat-
ric hospital, a prison, and-through mandatory attendance laws-a
school, the state should assume an affirmative duty in all of these
situations.
Pagano was the first decision to apply DeShaney in the public
school setting. The plaintiff was an elementary school student who
claimed that he had been attacked and abused in school by other
students on seventeen separate occasions. His Section 1983 claim
alleged that school officials had failed to fulfill their affirmative duty
to prevent the harm he suffered. 50 The court referred to several
Second Circuit cases in which the Estelle-Youngberg doctrine had
been applied to find that the government owed an affirmative duty
to the involuntarily committed and to prisoners.51 The court then
asserted that it "consider[ed] elementary school students who are
required to attend school, the truancy laws still being in effect, to
be owed some duty of care."52 The court implicitly reasoned that
if the state incurs an affirmative duty to protect a criminal whom
the state has "placed" in prison, then a similar duty should also
apply to protect a child that has been "placed" in school. State
compulsory education and truancy laws were deemed to be the
coercive tools of the state used to "place" a child in school. The
court adopted the Estelle-Youngberg analogy.
The court also made reference to the foster care footnote in
DeShaney, noting that the DeShaney Court did not address "the
question of whether a duty exists if [a] child had been placed in a
50 Pagano, 714 F. Supp. at 643.
51 See id. (citing Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1974) (psychiatric
patients) and Villante v. Dep't of Corrections, 786 F.2d 516, 519 (2d Cir. 1986)
(prisoners)).52 Id.
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foster home by [a] state agency and been abused there."5 3 The
Pagano court cited a Second Circuit decision that held an affirma-
tive duty does exist in the foster care context,54 and then stated
that "[t]he facts of the present case... appear to be closer to those
of [the foster care situation] than [those] of DeShaney in that the
victim and the perpetrator(s) were under the care of the school in
its parens patriae capacity at the time these alleged incidents oc-
curred."55 Using both the Estelle-Youngberg analogy and the foster
care footnote approach, the Pagano court provided early support for
the claim that an affirmative duty exists in the public school setting
under Deshaney.
5 6
Robert G. v. Newburgh City School District5 7 followed the same
line of reasoning as Pagano. The case involved the sexual assault of
a student by a substitute teacher who "had a record of numerous
arrests and convictions for crimes, including felonies and other acts
of violence. "5 8 The court, in denying the defendant's motion to
dismiss, did not discuss at length the affirmative constitutional duty
of a school district. The court did, however, respond to the
defendant's contention that DeShaney precluded liability by stating:
"[t]he student had been attending school pursuant to the require-
ments of New York Education Law. . ., and thus was 'in what may
be viewed as functional custody of the school authorities.'" 59 Like
the Pagano court, the Robert G. court adopted the Estelle-Youngberg
analogy. The court reasoned that students and prisoners are
analogous in that the state has given them no choice but to be in
the setting in which they are injured.
The court in Tilson v. School District of Philadelphia60 offered a
more thorough analysis of the affirmative duty required of public
5 3 Id. (citing DeShaneyv. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
201 n.9 (1989)).54 See id. (citing Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.
1981)).55 id.
56 It should be noted that the opinion in Pagano was a ruling on the defendant
school board's motion to dismiss. It was far from a thorough discussion of the issue,
but as noted, it did adopt an important line of reasoning. Having survived the
motion to dismiss, the case was settled out of court and thus no later opinion exists.
Telephone Interview with Henry A. Weinstein, Attorney for the Plaintiff (Dec. 1992).
5 No. 89 CIV. 2978 (RPP), 1990 WL 3210 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1990).58 Id. at *1.
59 Id. at *1 (citation omitted) (quoting Stonekingv. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 856
F.2d 594, 601 (3d Cir. 1988)).
60 No. CIV A. 89-1923, 1990 WL 98932 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1990), order aff'd, 932
F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1991).
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school officials and school districts after DeShaney. In Tilson, a four-
year-old day care student was sexually molested by a substitute
teacher. The court stated that "DeShaney arguably did not foreclose
the imposition of a constitutional duty on a school district to
provide adequate protection to children while in school." 61  On
the facts of the Tilson case itself, however, the imposition of an
affirmative duty was deemed inappropriate because preschool
attendance is not compulsory in Pennsylvania.62 Thus, the requi-
site element of state coercion required under either the Estelle-
Youngberg analogy or the foster care footnote approach was wholly
absent.
The Tilson court's dicta on the issue of the affirmative duty of
public school districts is the most complete coverage of the subject
in the series of decisions handed down immediately after DeShaney:
Arguably [the view] that students are in what may be viewed as
functional custody of the school authorities' during their presence
at school because they are required to attend under Pennsylvania
law ... is not inconsistent with the DeShaney opinion. Dicta in
DeShaney, that a state might be liable for a substantive due process
violation for failing to prevent foster parents' abuse of a foster
child placed in their custody by the state, leaves open the question
of a school's constitutional duty to provide adequate protection to
a student with whom it has a special custodial relationship. Based
on DeShaney's suggestion that a child placed in foster homes may
be more akin to an institutionalized or incarcerated person than
a child remaining in parental custody ... the child subject to
compulsory school attendance "may not be dissimilar" to a child
placed in a foster home.
63
Thus, the court identified both the Estelle-Youngberg analogy and the
foster care footnote approach.64
61 Id. at *3 (citing Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 723-24 (3d
Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Stoneking I1]).
62 See id. at *9.
6 1 Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Stoneking II, 882 F.2d at 723-24).
64 Interestingly, the court made the following comment about the situation of
young children not mandated by law to attend school:
Preschool attendance is not compulsory in Pennsylvania [until age
eight].... Participation in a Get Set [day care] program [in which plaintiff
was enrolled] is voluntary; parents choose to place their children in day
care. However, the tender years of preschool children... favor[s] imposing
the same constitutional duty to provide for their reasonable safety as for
institutionalized or incarcerated individuals.
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In Reeves v. Besonen,6 1 the court considered the claim of a high
school football player who was injured by fellow players during a
hazing incident on the team bus.66 As in Tilson, the plaintiff was
not covered by the state compulsory education law when he was
injured because the football team trip was an extracurricular and
wholly voluntary activity.67 Although Reeves seems to disallow the
imposition of an affirmative duty in contexts other than prisons or
psychiatric institutions,6 8 there is language which recognizes a
different interpretation of DeShaney. The court deemed relevant the
fact that the compulsory education law did not apply, stating that
"[i]n the absence of such State coercion, DeShaney makes clear that
the Constitution imposes no duty on the state to care for the
Plaintiffs safety."69 The court thus permitted the inference that
if the necessary "coercion" did exist, a duty could be triggered even
if the injury did not occur in a prison or psychiatric institution, but
rather in a public school. Here too the court seems to accept the
rationale of the Estelle-Youngberg analogy.
While DeShaney, at least on a superficial read, arguably precludes
the imposition of an affirmative duty on the state unless the state
has used its coercive power to place a citizen in a prison or insti-
tution, the courts that issued the opinions discussed in this Section
did not read DeShaney so narrowly. An affirmative duty was found
in the public school setting. Either the public school context was
deemed analogous to the prison or psychiatric institution by virtue
Id. (citation omitted). The court here seems to adopt a more expansive view of when
an affirmative duty should be triggered. It completely abandons the dogma that
asserts that the duty-triggering "special relationship" must be based on at least some
degree of state compulsion. This commentary by the court was purely academic,
however, because it found that "even if there were a duty, it is clear on the record
before the court that the conduct of the school district... did not exhibit deliberate
indifference to protecting children within their care from sexual abuse." Id.
65 754 F. Supp. 1135 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
6 See id. at 1136-38.
67 See id. at 1140.
6 8 The court used particularly grandiose language in this context:
The Constitution of the United States is, and must be, a document
of grandeur and wisdom which secures and protects the most
fundamental and sacrosanct rights of our people. To extend the
protections of the Constitution to the most mundane fracases of
everyday life cheapens and trivializes not only the Constitution
itself, but those rights and privileges which are protected under it,
as well.
Id. at 1141 n.2.
69 Id. at 1140.
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of the element of state coercion (the Estelle-Youngberg analogy), or
it was deemed sufficiently parallel to the foster care situation (the
"foster care footnote" approach).
B. Cases that Rejected the Pagano Approach
Soon after Pagano, however, a number of decisions were issued
which made clear that most lower federal courts were reading
DeShaney more strictly. Many courts reasoned that DeShaney
completely ruled out affirmative duties in any context except
involuntary institutionalization and imprisonment. Taking a slightly
less rigid approach, other courts did not explicitly state that the
Estelle-Youngberg contexts are the only situations where the state
incurs an affirmative duty, but they rejected the notion that public
schools are sufficiently analogous to Estelle-Youngberg. Whatever
their rationale, by denying the existence of an affirmative duty in
the public schools, the decisions discussed below stand in direct
contradiction to the Pagano line of cases.
InJO. v. Alton Community Unit School District 11,70 the Seventh
Circuit considered a Section 1983 claim against a school district for
failing to protect the plaintiffs against sexual molestation by a
teacher. The court flatly stated that "[s]choolchildren are not like
mental patients and prisoners such that the state has an affirmative
duty to protect them," and noted that beyond those specific
contexts, "the Supreme Court has never recognized such a duty."7
1
The claim that the compulsory education law in Illinois made school
children analogous to prisoners or involuntarily committed
psychiatric patients was clearly refuted. The court stated that, "[a]t
most, the state might require a child to attend school, but it cannot
be suggested that compulsory school attendance makes a child
unable to care for basic human needs," 7 2 as is the case with
prisoners or involuntarily committed psychiatric patients.
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits also rejected an affirmative duty
in the public school context. In Bonacci v. King,73 the Eighth
Circuit bluntly dismissed the claim of a student who had been
sexually abused in his high school. The court stated: "We reject
[the] contention that [t]his case falls within an exception to the
70 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990).
71 Id. at 272-73.
72 Id. at 272 (citation omitted).
73 No. 91-3849, 1992 WL 98293 (8th Cir. May 14, 1992).
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general rule pronounced in DeShaney; the only exception recognized
in that case, arising when a state has custody over the injured
individual, is not applicable in this instance."74 In Maldonado v.
Josey,75 the Tenth Circuit stated: "Under DeShaney, an affirmative
duty to protect arises only when the state 'so restrains an
individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for him-
self...' This type of restraint ... does not occur under New
Mexico compulsory attendance laws."
76
Thames v. Kimbrough 77 involved a student who was shot in
school when another student's handgun accidentally fired as he was
removing it from his school bag. In response to the plaintiffs
affirmative duty to protect claim, the court simply stated that
DeShaney "stands for the 'harsh proposition' that even when state
officials know that a person is in imminent danger of harm from a
third party.., the [Constitution] 'imposes upon those state officials
no obligation to prevent that harm.'"78 The plaintiff s complaint
was accordingly dismissed.79
The court in Doe v. Douglas County School District RE-i,8
dealing with a school psychologist who allegedly molested a high
school student, was similarly curt in dismissing the claim that the
school's officials had any affirmative duty to protect the plaintiff
from harm. Citing DeShaney and Alton, the court pronounced that,
unlike the condition of prisoners or involuntarily committed
psychiatric patients,
"[it cannot be suggested that compulsory school attendance makes
a child unable to care for basic human needs. The parents still
retain primary responsibility for feeding, clothing, sheltering, and
caring for the child."
... [A]s a matter of law ... plaintiff cannot rely on the
existence of a special relationship to hold Douglas County [school
officials] liable.
8 '
74 Id. at *1. A more thorough discussion by the Eighth Circuit (reaching the same
conclusion) can be found in DorothyJ. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., No. 92-2452, 1993
WL 406464 (8th Cir. Oct. 13, 1993).
75 975 F.2d 727 (1oth Cir. 1992).
7, Id. at 732 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200).
77 No. 91-C-600, 1991 WL 86037 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 1991).
78 Id. at *2 (quoting Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d 454, 457 (3d Cir. 1989)).
7' See id. at *3.
80 770 F. Supp. 591 (D. Colo. 1991).
81 Id. at 593-94 (quotingJ.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11,909 F.2d 267,
272 (7th Cir. 1990)).
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In Russell v. Fannin County School District,8 2 one student assault-
ed another student in the hallway of the school building during
school hours, breaking the other student's hand, fracturing his left
orbit, and damaging his eye. The court denied the existence of an
affirmative duty on the part of the state.8 Instead of simply citing
the Estelle-Youngberg doctrine as support for applying an affirmative
duty only in prisons or institutions, the court elaborated:
The state must somehow significantly limit an individual's freedom
or impair his ability to act on his own before it can be constitu-
tionally required to care and provide for that person.
The court is not suggesting that prisoners and mental patients
are an exhaustive list of all persons to whom the state owes some
affirmative duties, but the government ... has not rendered its
students so helpless that an affirmative constitutional duty to
protect arises.
8 4
Although the court here rejects the Estelle-Youngberg analogy, it does
not adopt the more stringent view that Estelle-Youngberg situations
are the only instances in which affirmative duties may be applied.
The court in Elliott v. New Miami Board of Education8 5 reviewed
the conflicting opinions of other courts and sided with those
decisions that refused to confer an affirmative duty upon public
school officials. The idea that school children's situations could be
analogized to those of prisoners was not accepted. The court
responded to the suggestion by arguing that the comparison "'of a
school yard to a prison may be a popular one for school-age
children, but we cannot recognize constitutional duties on a child's
lament. '"8 6 Similarly brusque language was used by the court in
Stauffer v. Orangeville School District.8 7 The court argued that if a
duty was imposed, then "every time a school child [was] assaulted by
the class bully during recess there would be a tort of constitutional
dimensions under 1983.
"88
82 784 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ga.), affid, 981 F.2d 1263 (11th Cir. 1992).
83 See id. at 1583.
8' Id. at 1582 (dtation omitted) (quoting Wideman v. Shallowford Community
Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1036 (11th Cir. 1987)).
s5 799 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
" Id. at 822 (quoting Alton Community Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d at 272-73). Other
district court cases finding no duty are: B.M.H. v. The Sch. Bd., 1993 WL 383559
(E.D. Va. Sept. 23, 1993) (no duty); Doe v. Petaluma Sch. Dist., No. C 93 0123 EFL,
1993 WL 359872 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 1993).
87 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19133 (N.D. III. May 17, 1990).
88 Id. at 14.
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Thus, it appeared that the lower federal courts were "beginning
to fall into line in deciding that public school officials have no
constitutional duty to protect students from harm.... 89 As will
be seen in Part C, however, the dispute is still alive and well.
C. The Split in the Circuits
Two recent decisions on this issue, Doe v. Taylor Independent
School District90 and D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
School,91 demonstrate that the courts' fractured approach has not
been resolved, and that the tension between the two competing
views continues to divide the judiciary. These cases also establish
a direct split on this issue at the appellate level, not just within the
district courts.
Doe v. Taylor, decided by the Fifth Circuit in October 1992, is
notable not only for reviving the imposition of an affirmative duty
but also for its eloquent and forceful language.9 2 Judge Goldberg
began his opinion with the following statement:
You would think it obvious that sexual molestation, when visited
upon one of our schoolchildren.., would undoubtedly violate her
constitutional right to be free from intrusions into bodily integrity.
You would also think it indisputable that a school superintendent
and a school principal, once aware that such reprehensible
conduct was taking place on their campus, would have not only a
moral duty, but also a legal duty, to stop it-that the Constitution
would not tolerate their looking the other way ....
89 Summary and Analysis: Schools Have Constitutional Duty to Protect Students from
Sexual Abuse, 61 U.S.L.W. 1062, 1062 (Nov. 3, 1992).
90 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066, reh g granted, 987 F.2d
231 (5th Cir. 1993).
91 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S Ct. 1045 (1993).
92 While all of the cases that involve instances of sexual or physical abuse of a
student by a teacher or school employee are shocking and saddening, the facts of the
Doe case are particularly noteworthy. The acts committed are not any more egregious
than those of the other cases, but the "indifference" of the school officials in this case
seems to rise to a level greater than any of the other ones. The "romantic
relationship" between the teacher and student in this case "was common knowledge
within the Taylor High community, not only among students, but also among parents
and faculty." Doe, 975 F.2d at 140. This particular teacher "made little effort to
conceal his fancy for his female students, writing explicit love notes to them, letting
them drive his truck, exhibiting explicit favoritism in class toward them, and
physically touching them in a manner not becoming a schoolteacher." Id. at 139.
Several reports were made to school officials; however, no one ever made any effort
to protect the plaintiff.
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We hold that ... the [school officials] had an affirmative,
constitutionally-based duty to protect her .... 93
The opinion cited two pre-DeShaney Fifth Circuit cases-Horton
v. Goose Creek Independent School District94 and Lopez v. Houston
Independent School District 9 5-which state that a public school
assumes a duty to protect school children from "harm posed by anti-
social activities."9 6 The Doe opinion then launched into a discus-
sion of the circumstances where a "special relationship" arises that
will trigger an affirmative duty:
A special relationship between the state and a child arises in
a variety of contexts: when a child is confined to a state mental
health facility; when a state social services agency removes a child
from his natural home and places him under state supervision; or
when a child has been placed in foster care. In these instances,
the state has, to varying degrees, assumed an obligation to protect
the child, in much the same way that a capable parent would. A
child generally depends on his parents to guard against the
dangers of his surroundings. This is a fundamental notion of our
organized society and at the heart of what many would dub "family
values." By removing the child from his home, even when the
child's best interests lie in such action, the state thereby obligates
itself to shoulder the burden of protecting the child from
foreseeable trauma....
... [B]y compelling a child to attend public school, the state
cultivates a special relationship with that child and thus owes him
an affirmative duty of protection. Although we too would not
equate "a school yard to a prison," we nevertheless find a school-
child to be in the "functional custody" of school officials.
9 7
Thus, the Fifth Circuit adopted the view of the earlier Pagano line
of decisions.
In direct contradiction to the Fifth Circuit's Doe v. Taylor
decision is the August 1992 Third Circuit opinion in D. v. Middle
Bucks Area Vocational Technical School.9 8 The plaintiffs in the D.R.
case were two female students in a high school graphics art class
who alleged that several of their male classmates physically, verbally,
93 Id. at 138.
94 690 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983).
9 817 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1987).916 Id. at 356 (quoting Horton, 690 F.2d at 480).
97 Doe, 975 F.2d at 146-47 (footnotes and citation omitted).
18 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
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and sexually molested them. 9 They were forced by their class-
mates into a unisex bathroom and a darkroom, both of which were
part of the classroom.10 0 The teacher in the graphic arts class
"admittedly experienced difficulty in controlling the class general-
ly."1 01 She "witnessed daily the chaotic behavior that took place
in her classroom and was present when the male students grabbed
at D.R., touched her breasts, pushed her down, and dragged her
into the bathroom. The teacher's general reaction was to ignore the
behavior or walk away."10 2 Although a report was allegedly made
to the Assistant Director of the school, none of the school officials
intervened.1 03
As the court phrased the issue, it had to determine if the
compulsory education law and the school's in loco parentis
authority created a "custody" situation sufficiently akin to a prison
or psychiatric institution. The court rejected this contention flatly:
"Our court has read DeShaney primarily as setting out a test of
physical custody.... [T]he school defendants' authority over D.R.
during the school day cannot be said to create the type of physical
custody necessary to bring it within the special relationship noted
in DeShaney .... "104 The court made efforts to distinguish the
public school situation from the Estelle-Youngberg context:
The state's duty to prisoners and involuntarily committed patients
exists because of the full time severe and continuous state
restriction of liberty in both environments. Institutionalized
persons are wholly dependant upon the state for food, shelter,
clothing and safety. It is not within their power to provide for
themselves, nor are they given the opportunity to seek outside
help to meet their basic needs. Obviously, they are not free to
leave.
. .. [Conversely,] public school parents retain the discretion
to remove the child from classes as they see fit .... 105
The court also addressed the argument that public schools are
akin to foster care:
99 See id. at 1366.
100 See id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1378 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
103 See id. at 1366.
104 Id. at 1370, 1372.
105 Id. at 1371 (citations omitted).
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[W]e do note that although the situation of a public school student
is perhaps closer to that of a foster child than to an institutional-
ized person, the foster care analogy is not decisive.
A relationship between the state and foster children arises out
of the state's affirmative act in finding the children and placing
them with state-approved families. By so doing, the state assumes
an important continuing, if not immediate, responsibility for the
child's well- being. In addition, the child's placement renders him
or her dependent upon the state, through the foster family, to
meet the child's basic needs. Students, on the other hand, do not
depend upon the schools to provide for their basic human
needs.
106
Chief Judge Sloviter authored a powerfully worded dissent:
I believe that we are free to decide, as I would hold, that the
state compulsion that students attend school, the status of most
students as minors whose judgment is not fully mature, the
discretion extended by the state to schools to control student
behavior, and the pervasive control exercised by the schools over
their students during the period of time they are in school,
combine to create the type of special relationship which imposes
a constitutional duty on the schools to protect the liberty interests
of students while they are in the state's functional custody.
... In this case, unlike DeShaney, the harm was inflicted while
the victim was in the state's custody and/or care.
1 0 7
Chief Judge Sloviter insisted that nothing in the DeShaney
opinion supported the majority's holding that "the duty to protect
can be triggered only by involuntary, round-the-clock, legal custody.
Nothing in the opinion suggests that compulsory school attendance
cannot qualify as the type of state restraint of personal liberty which
gives rise to a duty to protect." 0 8 She cited the foster care
footnote as supporting her claim that DeShaney was being read too
narrowly by the majority.
I0 9
106 Id. at 1372 (citations omitted).
107 Id. at 1377, 1379 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). Sloviter also argued that
"[a]Ithough a student is not held in school under shackles, there is substantial
compulsion associated with schooling." Id. at 1379. Sloviter noted that "[t]he
compulsory nature of public school attendance is not lessened by the fact that a few
fortunate students have the option to attend private school or be educated at home.
For the vast majority of children of school age, this is no choice at all." Id. at 1380.
108 Id. at 1379.
109 See id.
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Having criticized the majority's use of DeShaney, Chief Judge
Sloviter then emphasized that most "secondary school students are
minors ... [whose] judgment may not be fully mature" and that




The majority's restrictive view of the "special relationship" . . . is
particularly troubling, not only because it is based on the errone-
ous premise that its decision is compelled by precedent but also
because it is so sweeping that it is unlikely that any state-imposed
restraint of personal liberty short of incarceration or involuntary
commitment will trigger the duty to protect....
There is no doubt that this case falls between DeShaney and
Estelle/Youngberg.111
As Doe v. Taylor and D.R. v. Middle Bucks Vocational Technical
School indicate, the battle in the courts over affirmative duties in
public schools was joined by the Fifth and Third Circuits. Because
the Supreme Court recently denied petitions for certiorari in both
of these cases, it appears that this sensitive issue will continue to
plague the judiciary.
1 1 2
III. WHEN THE STATE SHOULD HAVE AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY
TO PROTECT A CITIZEN
Clearly, courts need to draw some lines when imposing
affirmative duties on the state. Holding the state liable for its
inaction "poses very serious difficulties," Judge Posner notes,
because "[t]he men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned
that government might do too little for the people but that it might
do too much to them."1 13 Courts have repeatedly emphasized
that the Bill of Rights does not confer affirmative rights to govern-
mental assistance, but is rather a charter of negative liberties. These
writings point out that the Bill of Rights prevents the state from
doing something to an individual, but does not guarantee that the
state will do for her.
1 14
110 Id. at 1380.
I" Id. at 1383.
112 See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 113 S. Ct. 1045
(1993) (denial of certiorari) and Caplinger v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 1066 (1993) (denial of
certiorari).
113 Sinden, supra note 20, at 230 (quotingJackson v. City ofJoliet, 715 F.2d 1200,
1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984)).
114 See MichaelJ. Florio, Note, An Abused Child's Right to Life, Liberty and Property
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This principle of constitutional construction aside, concerns
surrounding the "[d]iscretionary [a]llocation of [p]ublic [r]esour-
ces" 115 create strong arguments for limiting the instances in which
the state incurs an affirmative duty to protect a citizen. In a society
where government resources are scarce, and difficult choices must
be made about how best to allocate those resources, courts and
commentators persuasively argue that the more politically respon-
sive executive and legislative branches are better equipped than the
courts to make those budgetary choices.
116
There is also a more general fear that the imposition of
affirmative duties will lead to the creation of "big government," with
unlimited power in society. This concern is evident in cases
involving police officers and firefighters. Although the concept may
seem counter-intuitive, as a general matter, police officers and
firefighters have no affirmative duty to protect citizens from harm.
In Jackson v. City of Joliet,117 the court held that a police officer
who came upon an automobile accident had no duty to look for or
rescue a person trapped in the car. The opinion expressed concern
that "the next case ... will be one where the police and fire
departments, maybe because of budget cuts, do not arrive at the
scene of the accident at all." 118 The court reasoned that holding
the police or firefighters liable would be totally unacceptable
because it would force municipalities to supply endless funds for its
service providers. The court forcefully warned against any argu-
ment that could lead to a general constitutional duty to "provide
basic services."
119
These concerns about separation of powers and "big govern-
ment" should be somewhat mitigated by the fact that any affirmative
duty on the part of the state would be an exception to the rule that
the state has no duty to rescue its citizens. 120 Again, as a general
in the Home: Constitutional Approval of State Inaction, 92 W. VA. L. REV. 175, 195
(1989).
115 Thomas A. Eaton & Michael L. Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional
Tort: DeShaney and its Aftermath, 66 WAsH. L. REV. 107, 128 (1991).
116 See e.g., id. at 128-29; kiss v. City of New York, 240 N.E.2d. 860, 860-61 (N.Y.
1968) ("For the courts to proclaim a new and general duty of protection... could
and would inevitably determine how.., limited ... resources should be allocated
117 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
118 Id. at 1204.
119 Id. at 1203-04.
120 See Eaton & Wells, supra note 115, at 109; supra note 19 and accompanying
text.
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matter, the affirmative duty is applied only in circumstances where
the state has entered into a "special relationship" with the citi-
zen. 12 1  Yet even within this exception, there are legitimate
concerns about avoiding the imposition of an affirmative duty in too
many situations, and lines must be drawn.
On the surface, it would appear that the most easily implement-
ed test would be to limit the imposition of an affirmative duty
strictly to the contexts of prisons and institutions-a stringent Estelle-
Youngberg doctrine. Commentators have noted, however, that
"limiting affirmative duties to instances of involuntary confinement
or analogues of confinement is arbitrary and unwise." 122  As
Professors Eaton and Wells explain:
One important test of a liability rule is whether it reaches the full
range of cases in which recovery is appropriate, or at least an
acceptably large portion of them. The involuntary confinement
rule fails on this score, for it falls short of embracing all instances
of official misconduct impinging a plaintiff's constitutionally
protected right to respectful treatment by government offi-
cers. 1
23
Specific examples of the type of cases that would be "missed" by an
Estelle-Youngberg rule are considered below. It is important to note
here, however, that even the DeShaney Court, a court clearly
opposed to expanding constitutional liability for inaction, purposely
avoided such a limited approach by leaving open the question of
foster care.
124
Another possible approach to liability for state inaction would
be to limit affirmative duties to situations where the state has
undertaken "legal custody" of the victim. However, "the ambiguity
inherent in the term 'custody'" raises significant problems when
attempting to apply such a test.1 25 "Custody," it turns out, is a
very "malleable" term in the law.126 For example, in Horton v.
Flenoy127 the police knew that a private club owner (an ex-police-
man) was questioning a man about a recent incident at the club and
121 DeShaney is unanimously read as "foreclos[ing] the argument that there is a
general constitutional right to protection." Eaton & Wells, supra note 115, at 158.
122 Id. at 11.
'2s Id. at 144.
124 See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
125 Sinden, supra note 20, at 247.
126 Id. at 250.
127 889 F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1989).
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condoned the owner's actions.1 28 The club owner ended up
beating the man to death during the course of his "questioning."
The court held that the plaintiff's decedent had been in "custody"
at the time of his death for purposes of an affirmative duty
analysis.1 29 Thus, the concept of custody is not as straightforward
as it may appear.
As one commentator remarked:
The meaning of the word "custody" varies significantly depending
upon the context in which it is used. Asking whether someone is
in "custody" in a Miranda case is entirely different from asking
whether a child is in "custody" in the context of a domestic
relations dispute. "Custody" does not in and of itself clearly
designate a specific set of parameters .... 130
Both a "legal custody" test or a strict Estelle-Youngberg test would
be plagued by significant shortcomings. There are a variety of
circumstances outside of either the Estelle-Youngberg context, or any
circumstance that may reasonably be deemed "custodial," where it
would seem wholly appropriate to impose an affirmative duty.
Indeed, lower courts have not hesitated to do so. For example, in
Wood v. Ostrander,13 1 a woman was abandoned by police in a
desolate area, late at night, after they had confiscated her car and
arrested her companion. 32 The woman was subsequently at-
tacked and raped by a stranger13 3 Clearly, there was an interven-
ing actor, but it can nevertheless safely be said that the state
"caused" the woman's "predicament." 134 The Ninth Circuit held
that the police conduct toward the plaintiff "distinguishes [her]
from the general public and triggers a duty of the police to afford
her some measure of peace and safety."13 5 Consider the Seventh
Circuit's opinion upholding liability for inaction in White v.
Rochford.136 In White, the police had stopped a car on an expressway
128 See id. at 456.
129 See id. at 458. Some cases, however, have construed "custody" more strictly.
See, e.g., Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Servs., 871 F.2d 474 (4th
Cir.) (construing "custody" to refer to the narrow relationship of child and foster
parents), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989).
130 Sinden, supra note 20, at 248.
1 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990).
132 See id. at 586.
133 See id.
134 See Rosalie B. Levinson, Protection Against Government Abuse of Power Has the
Court Taken the Substance Out of Substantive Due Process?, 16 U. DAYrON L. REv. 313,
341 (1991).
135 Wood, 879 F.2d at 590.
136 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979); see also Eaton & Wells, supra note 115, at 144
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and arrested the driver for drag racing and speeding.1 37  The
driver repeatedly requested that the police call for assistance, but
the officers left the driver's child passengers alone in the car.
13 8
One of the children had asthma, became very ill, and was hospital-
ized for over a week after the incident.13 9 The Seventh Circuit
held that the children stated a valid Section 1983 claim.
140
These fact patterns are certainly distinguishable from a prison
or psychiatric institution situation, and do not resemble "custody"
in any meaningful way. Nevertheless, "[e]ven judges who are
generally hostile to the expansion of affirmative duties now agree
that the plaintiffs ... stated a good constitutional tort case."
14 1
Commentators have noted that "the difference between placing a
person in custody and using state authority to leave him stranded
in a dangerous place seems too insubstantial to support a rule that
would permit liability in the former case but not the latter."
142
If courts limited the imposition of affirmative duties to prisons,
institutions, and other arguably "custodial" situations, many
plaintiffs who have clearly suffered at the hands of the state's
abusive behavior would be without recourse under Section 1988.
The affirmative duty issue poses the following question to the
courts: "If the Constitution [or federal law] sometimes ...
require[s] government officials to help persons in distress, what
circumstances trigger a duty to act?" 143 The courts' doctrinal
analysis is overtly concerned with categorizing situations (i.e.,
prisons, institutions, foster care). The underlying principle behind
this categorization, however, has been identified by commentators
and has been explicitly noted by some courts. This Comment
suggests that the principle can be articulated as follows: The state
should be held to an affirmative duty when the state has coerced the
citizen into a situation in which she is vulnerable to harm (or at
least more vulnerable than she would have been outside of that
situation) and, in particular, where the state has put the citizen in
a situation where access to assistance is difficult to obtain. This
(discussing White).




140 See id. at 384-86.
141 Eaton & Wells, supra note 115, at 144-45 (referring to judge Easterbrook and
Judge Posner).
' 42 Id. at 144.
143 Id. at 107.
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Comment argues that these concerns, instead of the current
categorical approach, should be the direct focus ofjudicial inquiry.
When courts decide affirmative duty cases by asking whether a
particular situation is like a prison, psychiatric institution, or other
"custodial" situation, they frequently involve themselves in the
fruitless task of attempting to draw "coherent analog[ies]." 144 It
is difficult to say with any certainty whether a "school yard is like a
prison"145 or whether a child placed in foster care is like a child
placed in a classroom. Analogous elements exist in each situation,
but any definitive statement that they are "alike" or "dissimilar" is
almost always an oversimplification. By focusing instead on the
degree of vulnerability and ability to seek assistance, a court's
inquiry would be more relevant to identifying when the state has
"significantly contribute[d] to the plaintiff's need for
assistance,"146 and thus should be held to an affirmative duty.
Professors Eaton and Wells argue for an analysis of constitu-
tional affirmative duties that recognizes the various ways in which
the state plays a role in making someone vulnerable to harm.
14 7
Eaton and Wells assert that constitutional liability for government
inaction should be based on an inquiry into the degree of state
involvement in producing the plaintiff's plight.
1 48
Another commentator who directly examined the issue of
affirmative duties in the public school context (but did so prior to
the two most recent and thorough appellate level decisions on this
point) noted that it is "not the state's legal status as custodian"
which should trigger the obligation for affirmative action. 149 The
author criticized the idea of basing an affirmative duty on any overly
formalistic conception of the state-victim relationship:
Although the formal relationship may serve as an indicator of the
underlying vulnerability and of the victim's corresponding depen-
dency on the state for protection, it is only an indicator. Courts
... should be concerned principally with the extent to which the
state, by limiting the victim's freedom or by taking upon itself the
responsibility for some of her care, increases the victim's depen-
dence on state protection. Affirmative duties should exist
whenever the state has created this dependency, regardless of
44 Id. at 146.
1
4 5 J.O. v. Alton Community Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 273 (7th Cir. 1990).
146 Eaton & Wells, supra note 115, at 111.
147 See id. at 108-11 (emphasis added).
148 See id. at 111.
149 Huefner, supra note 3, at 1957.
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whether it arises out of a relationship that is technically custodial.
This type of dependency could be found to be associated with
youths in foster care, with school children, or with individuals
detained by private citizens informally deputized as police
officers.
150
The two most recent appellate level decisions dealing with the
affirmative duty question in the public school context offer the most
extensive discussion of its underlying principles. By closely
examining the court's commentary, it becomes apparent that the
courts do recognize that the vulnerability of the victim and her
access to assistance are, at bottom, the central concerns in determin-
ing when the state should be held to an affirmative duty.
In Doe v. Taylor, the court acknowledged that children's inability
to care for themselves is generally taken for granted in our society
and that their well-being is entrusted to their parents or guard-
ians. 151 Given that assumption, if the state, through compulsory
education laws, separates children from their "protectors" for any
period of time, the state leaves children vulnerable and "incapable
of fending for [themselves]." 15 2 The Taylor court stated that an
affirmative duty should be imposed because the state substantially
hindered the child's access to a source of assistance she would
ordinarily call upon-her parent or guardian. By "render[ing] the
guardian.., powerless to act on the child's behalf[,] ... the state
assumes a corresponding duty."
5 3
The dissent in D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
School is the clearest expression of the focus on vulnerability and
access to outside assistance:
[T]he School District cannot claim that it did not play some role
in creating the danger to D.R. or making her more vulnerable.
Here, it was the school that designed the unisex lavatory in the
classroom; ... it was the school that hired an inexperienced
student teacher; and it was the school that tolerated the chaotic
behavior and the sexual aggressiveness of the students....
Thus, in this case I would find that the plaintiffs have
sufficiently pled facts alleging a breach of duty to protect triggered
15 Id. (emphasis added).
151 See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 146 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066 (1993) ("A child generally depends on his parents to guard
against the dangers of his surroundings.").152 Id.
153 Id.
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by the special relationship that arises between vulnerable school
children and their public schools.
1 54
The dissent also chastised the majority for insisting that
schoolchildren, unlike prisoners, "have meaningful access to sources
of help."'5 5 After noting that truancy laws would expose children
to punishment if they left the school, that school authorities
typically would not allow a parent or guardian to attend classes with
a child to assure her safety, and that children are generally reluctant
to report sexual abuse, 156 Chief Judge Sloviter stated that "It]here
is, at least, a factual issue presented in this case as to whether D.R.
was in a position effectively to seek help."
157
Although the majority in D.R refused to find a special relation-
ship in the public school setting, they too recognized the impor-
tance of examining the victim's access to outside assistance. The
court stated that a special relationship exists when "the State, by the
affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's
liberty"1 58 that she is "left without reasonable means of self
protection."
159
The decision in Russell also indicates that the vulnerability of the
victim and her access to assistance are the relevant concerns:
[A] constitutional duty can arise only when a state or municipality,
by exercising a significant degree of control over an individual,
places that person in a worse situation than he would have been
had the government not acted at all. Such a situation could arise
by virtue of the states affirmatively placing an individual in a
position of danger, effectively stripping a person of her ability to
defend herself or cutting off potential sources of private aid.
160
154 D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1382,
1384 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993).
155 Id. at 1381.
156 See id. at 1380-81. Note that ChiefJudge Sloviter also stated that "prisoners
are probably much more articulate about their complaints about mistreatment than
are school children, particularly when the treatment consists ... of sexual abuse."
Id. at 1381.
157 id.
158 Id. at 1370 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489
U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).
159 Id.
160 Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576, 1582 (N.D. Ga.) (citing
Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1035 (lth Cir.
1987)), aff'd without opinion, 981 F.2d 1263 (11th Cir. 1992).
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In Archie v. City of Racine,161 the Seventh Circuit had this to
say about relying on a categorical "special relationship" analysis to
determine when the state incurs an affirmative duty:
Like other legal phrases, [the term "special relationship"] has
acquired a life of its own. Instead of being a shorthand for the
kind of circumstances ... in which the state either deliberately
inflicted injury or greatly increased risk while constricting access to self-
help-it has become a magic phrase-a category in which to dump
cases .... Instead of trying to define the phrase with greater
precision, it is better to jettison the language while adhering to the
principles that the phrase once summarized. When the state puts a
person in danger, the Due Process Clause requires the state to protect him
to the extent of ameliorating the incremental risk. When a state cuts off
sources of private aid, it must provide replacement protection.1
62
Thus, the idea of foregoing the categorical "special relationship"
doctrine in favor of a more direct inquiry into vulnerability and
access to assistance is well-supported in literature and case law. The
approach this Comment suggests would focus the courts' attention
more directly on the important principles implicated by the
affirmative duty question.
Certainly the approach suggested in this Comment does not
provide easy answers. By asking how vulnerable the victim is in the
state-created situation and how much access she had to outside
assistance, courts enter into a difficult realm of quantification. How
much vulnerability is enough to trigger a duty? Exactly how much
must the victim be hindered in her ability to seek help from outside
the situation? These difficult and very basic questions have no
simple answer. It should be noted, however, that by having the
courts wrestle with these questions, instead of trying to make
analogies to prisons or to "custody," the courts' attention will be
focused more clearly on the underlying concern of when the state
should have an affirmative obligation to protect its citizens.
IV. A MIDDLE GROUND ON THE ISSUE OF AFFIRMATIVE
DUTY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
As discussed in Part II, courts have dealt with affirmative duty
claims in the public school context in two ways. Either the school
officials have a "special relationship" with students (and thus an
161 847 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
162 Id. at 1123 (emphasis added).
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affirmative duty to protect them), or there is no "special relation-
ship" and the officials cannot be held liable for their inaction. This
"all or nothing" approach is not necessary. A court reluctant to
expand the scope of affirmative duties could hold that in some
public school cases the school defendants do have a duty, without
necessarily deciding that such a duty will be imposed in all public
school cases. A workable and valid middle ground, rooted in the
vulnerability principle discussed in Part III, is conceivable.
The public school affirmative duty cases can be divided into two
categories: (1) where the public school officials failed to protect a
student from harm inflicted by another student and (2) where the
injury was caused by a teacher or public school employee. This
Comment argues that courts should find a duty at least where the
abuse or molestation is perpetrated by a teacher or school employ-
ee. This decision would not be "all or nothing," however. Holding
that school officials and districts have an affirmative duty to protect
students from abuse or molestation by teachers or school employ-
ees, based on the rationale suggested in this Comment, does not
dictate an outcome on the question of affirmative duty in the case
of abuse of a student by a student.
165
163 After this Comment was written (but before it was published), a district court
in Pennsylvania adopted the distinction that this Comment suggests. A set of
companion cases, C.M. v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., 828 F. Supp 1179 (E.D. Pa.
1993), and K.L. v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., 828 F. Supp. 1192 (E.D. Pa. 1993) dealt
with nearly identical accusations of offensive and abusive conduct by a seventh and
eighth grade special education teacher. The plaintiff in each case was different,
however, and therefore the court issued two separate opinions.
After the D.R. and Black opinions it seemed clear that there was no affirmative
duty in the public schools in the Third Circuit. The court in C.M. and K.L., however,
found otherwise. Specifically, the court stated that:
[We] find that the question of whether the alleged perpetrator is a state
actor is equally determinative.
[We] believe that states do have an affirmative duty to protect students
in public schools from abusive conduct by their teachers. Public school
teachers are state employees who are hired by, answerable to, and
controllable by, school administrators, who are also state actors. School
districts must hire teachers.... School districts may fire teachers for
"immorality, incompetency, intemperance, cruelty, persistent negligence,
mental derangement ..... " Teachers are to be rated for competency by the
superintendent .... Thus, the school district-a state entity, and its
administrators-state employees, are responsible for hiring, firing, monitor-
ing, and evaluating teachers, who are also state employees.
A school district's affirmative duty to protect its students from their
teachers derives from these responsibilities, none of which were present in
D.R. or Black, since school districts have no such obligations to supervise
students ....
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The Fifth Circuit's decision in Doe v. Taylor hinted at this
distinction:
[W]e conclude that public school officials have a duty to police the
misconduct of their subordinates and to protect schoolchildren
from hazards of which the school officials know or should know.
Their deliberate indifference to these duties can form the basis of
liability against them. This does not mean that school officials are liable
in the ordinay course for injuries to students inflicted by fellow stu-
dents.
164
While the court did not elaborate on this point, it appears that it
did recognize some substantive difference between the two types of
cases.
The obvious question, however, is the following: What substan-
tive difference does it make, in terms of Section 1983 liability,
whether a student is abused by a teacher or by a fellow student?
The proposal is best understood by rephrasing the relevant
inquiry. Instead of asking when a "special relationship" exists, the
inquiry should be: For what types of harms to a citizen should a
state be held liable if the state is deliberately indifferent?16 5 The
C.M., 828 F. Supp. at 1189 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
While the distinction the court made in this case is the same distinction
suggested by this Comment, the rationale the court offered for the distinction is
different. In fact, it may be argued that the court's explanation for distinguishing
between students harmed by teachers and those harmed by their peers comes
dangerously close to adopting a respondeat superior theory of liability. The court
seems to argue that because the teacher is employed by the school district or school
officials, those officials should be held liable for the abusive behavior of a teacher.
It is well-settled, though, that respondeat superior is inapplicable in Section 1983
cases. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
The court does hint at another rationale for distinguishing between cases of
abuse by students and cases of abuse by school personnel. The court speaks of the
"great sensitivity of a teacher's job" as an additional reason for making the distinction.
KL, 828 F. Supp. at 1195. While the court never elaborates on the significance of
this "sensitivity," the language does seem to recognize the importance of the teacher's
position in the classroom. Thus, the court implies that it would be hospitable to the
rationale that this Comment offers for distinguishing between student on student
abuse versus teacher on student abuse-namely, that the state, by its affirmative
action, renders the student particularly vulnerable to harm from teachers and school
personnel. These authority figures present unique difficulties not encountered when
students are faced with abuse by other students. See infra text accompanying note
166; infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
164 Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 147 (5th Cir. 1992) (emphasis
added), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066 (1993).
165 For a discussion of the shortcomings of analyzing the affirmative duty question
by askingwhen a "special relationship" exists, see supra text accompanying notes 161-
62.
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underlying principles discussed in Part III provide the answer to
that question: Harms that occur when the state has placed the
citizen in a situation in which she is particularly vulnerable to that
type of harm (or at least more vulnerable to it than she would have
been if the state had not forced her into the situation), and,
particularly, where the state has put the citizen in a situation in
which it is difficult for her to seek outside assistance.
This Comment argues that the identity of the perpetrator is
relevant to this inquiry. Students are particularly vulnerable to
harm inflicted by those in positions of authority, and face unique
difficulties in seeking assistance when they are being abused by this
type of perpetrator. The state, by creating these positions of
authority166 and mandating attendance at school, is directly
implicated in the child's vulnerability to harm at the hands of
teachers or school employees. Hence, when a teacher or school
employee is the abuser, the school officials and school districts
should be held to an affirmative duty to protect students.
The major underlying assumption beneath this suggested middle
ground is that children are particularly vulnerable to harm from
school personnel/authority figures and that they face unique
difficulties in seeking outside assistance when they are injured by
school employees. This assumption is supported by both social
science research and case law.
Despite the growing body of literature on the sexual abuse of
children, there is surprisingly little research on abuse in school
settings specifically. 167 At least one commentator has suggested that
"the presence of sexual abuse in the school context... [is] a salient
problem for researchers, educators, and policymakers" and noted
the need for future social science investigation. 168 Further
research is likely to appear shortly, as the number of reported cases
of abuse and molestation has increased tremendously over a short
period.
169
166 See infra note 186.
167 See Gail P. Sorenson, Sexual Abuse in Schools: Reported Court Cases from 1987-
1990, 27 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 460, 462-63 (1991) (explaining, for example, that "the
number or percentage of children who are abused in schools is not known").
168 See id. at 461.
169 "As recently as the early 1980s, reportedjudicial decisions dealingwith sexual
abuse committed by teachers or other school employees against students were
exceedingly rare." Sorenson, supra note 167, at 460. Between 1987 and 1991,
however, there were 51 opinions published dealing with such situations. See id. at
463. Some of these cases have received a great deal of publicity. For example, an
incident in a Philadelphia-area school involving a music teacher who used fraudulent
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The research that has been done on abuse and molestation in
public schools does support the proposition that children are
especially vulnerable to abuse by teachers. Dr. Samuel M. Basta and
Dr. Robert F. Peterson conducted a study which compared a group
of children recently molested by a teacher to a group of children
recently molested by a family member.170 They evaluated both
groups by using the Personality Inventory for Children, a scientific
method of measuring mental health in such areas as depression,
withdrawal, and anxiety.171 They concluded that there were "no
significant differences between the two groups." 17 2 In explaining
why abuse by a teacher had as devastating an effect on children as
abuse by a primary caregiver, they emphasized the importance of
the teacher-child relationship. In many cases, they noted, "[the
teacher] spent more time with... the children than [the children]
spent with their own parents."
1 7
They also made the following observations about the vulnerabili-
ty of children to abuse by a teacher:
[The teacher] had considerable power over the children's behavior
.... He ... use[d] attention, affection, physical contact, and
access to privileges to influence them. If a child refused his
requests, he or she was not overtly pressured to be involved [in
sexual behavior], but did miss out on special activities that were
limited to those children who participated....
In many ways, the relationship between [the teacher] and the
children was like that of a family member, and in some cases
probably closer.... Indeed, it may be that those adults with [such]
a close nurturing relationship with the child have the potential to
create the greatest damage via sexual abuse.
174
A 1990 article entitled Abuse and Neglect in Schools1 75 noted the
unique difficulties encountered by children when faced with the
possibility of reporting abuse or molestation by a teacher:
methods to induce a student to perform oral sex on him was the subject of numerous
headlines in recent months. See Amy S. Rosenberg, After Arrest Hurt Settles in at
School, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 15, 1993, at Bi.
170 See Samuel M. Basta & Robert F. Peterson, Perpetrator Status and the Personality
Characteristics of Molested Children, 14 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 555, 555 (1990).
171 See id. at 559.
172 Id.
'73 Id. at 561.
174 Id. at 561-63.
175 Max Sugar, Abuse and Neglect in Schools, 44 AM.J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 484 (1990).
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Parents are usually held in high esteem by their offspring and
when they abuse their child the youngster denies, splits, and
projects the blame and negative affects onto the self or others, but
not the idealized parent.... It would appear that... youngsters
do the same about the abusing teacher. Their idealized transfer-
ence to teachers makes it difficult for them to report the physical/
sexual/emotional abuse.., that occurs in school.... This would
explain the relative paucity of reporting of teachers for incidents
of child maltreatment .... 176
There have been a number of well publicized incidents of sexual
abuse in day care. While these children are younger than public
school students, and day care is different in other respects from a
public school, 177 some of the research done on these cases is
helpful. A book entitled Nursery Crimes178 documents the infamous
McMartin episode in which scores of children were abused in their
nursery school over a number of years. In analyzing this pedophilic
behavior, the authors rejected the idea that abuse in day care grows
out of a specific sexual attraction for these young children. They
determined instead that "much of the abuse seems more opportu-
nistic in nature. By opportunistic, we mean.., that the key factor
about the children was ... their availability and their vulnerabili-
ty."
179
Another body of research has focused on the unique problems
children face when abused by what individual researchers have
dubbed "authority figures." In the first national survey of adults
concerning a history of childhood sexual abuse, victimization was
reported by 27% of women, and 16% of men.1 8 "Half the of-
fenders were seen by the victims to be authority figures."
18 1
176 Id. at 494 (footnote omitted).
177 Day care program attendance, for one thing, is not mandated by law. In Tilson
v. School Dist., No. CIV. A. 89-1923, 1990 WL 98932 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1990), order
affd, 932 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1991), for example, the Section 1983 suit of a four-year-
old day care student was dismissed because "[p]reschool attendance is not compulso-
ry." Id. at *9.
178 DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., NURSERY CRIMES: SExuAL ABUSE IN DAY CARE
(1988).
179 Id. at 55.
180 See David Finkelhor et al., Sexual Abuse in a National Survey of Adult Men and
Women: Prevalence, Characteristics, and Risk Factors, 14 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 19,
19 (1990).
18' Id. at 21.
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It should also be noted that studies have revealed that the
psychological impact of abuse by authority figures is worse than the
impact of abuse by others.' A study by Leslie Feinauer found that:
As Browne and Finkelhor (1986) indicated, clinical and
popular belief assume that sexual violation by a relative is more
traumatic than when someone from outside the family is the
perpetrator. Contrary to this notion, the results of this study
indicate that family relationship is not as important in determining
the trauma of sexual abuse as the type of personal relationship the
victim had with the abuser.
The most important finding from this study was the increase
in emotional distress seen in victims who were abused by a person
who was known to and trusted by them.
182
While not overtly relying on the type of social science research
discussed above, courts have explicitly recognized that certain
relationships place the child in a particularly difficult situation when
it comes to child abuse. "[U]ncertainty becomes confusion when an
abuser who fulfills a caring-parenting role in the child's life tells the
child that what seems wrong to the child is, in fact, all right.
Because of the child's confusion, shame, guilt, and fear, disclosure
of the abuse is often long delayed."18 3  Indeed, the Supreme
Court noted in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie184 that "[a] child's feelings
of vulnerability and guilt and his or her unwillingness to come forward
are particularly acute when the abuser is a parent."'8 5  Thus, the
nation's highest court has recognized that the nature of the
relationship between the child and her abuser is relevant to both the
vulnerability of the child to injury, and the ability of the child to
seek assistance.
Given the in loco parentis186 role of the teacher, and the fact
182 Leslie L. Feinauer, Comparison of Long-Term Effects of Child Abuse by Type of
Abuse and by Relationship of the Offender to the Victim, 17 AM.J. FAM. THERAPY 48, 54
(1989); see also SANDY K. WURTELE & CINDY L. MILLER-PERRIN, PREVENTING CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE 14 (1992) (noting that when "children are sexually victimized by
people they know and trust[, they] have to deal not only with the trauma of the
molestation but also the violation of trust").
183 State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn. 1984).
114 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
185 Id. at 60 (emphasis added).
186 The term in loco parentis refers to a teacher's authority to perform the role
of the parent while students are at school. This power is a basic common-law
principle. See In re Donaldson, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Indiana
State Personnel Bd. v.Jackson, 192 N.E.2d. 740, 743-44 (Ind. 1963); see also JOACHIM
F. WELTziN, THE LAw OF AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION 141 (1967) ("In the common
508 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:471
that literature on child abuse includes "educators," as well as
parents, in the category of "authority figures," 187 it follows that
courts would accept the idea that the unique difficulties encoun-
tered by children when faced with abusive parents also apply when
they are faced with abusive teachers.
Abuse by teachers/authority figures thus presents unique
problems not faced when students are abused by their peers.
Students are uniquely vulnerable to abuse by authority figures
because these are people they are supposed to respect and obey and
they also have a more difficult time reporting abuse by authority
figures than they do reporting abuse by peers.18 8 While students
are certainly vulnerable to abuse by their peers, and may also have
difficulty reporting such abuse, the unique difficulties faced by
students abused by teachers or school personnel-by virtue of their
law, the teacher is said to stand... in the place of the parent."). Some states confer
this authority statutorily. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.256(1) (West 1989); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 105, para. 5/34-84a (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1993). The in loco parentis
power of teachers is not a wholesale conferral of parental power, however. The
Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, for example,
does apply to searches carried out by school officials. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 333 (1985). The Constitution would not, of course, place any restriction on
parents.
187 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER BAGLEY & KATHLEEN KING, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 74
(1990) (including teachers and ministers as authority figures).
188 Certainly it can be argued that the vulnerability of a student decreases as they
become older. A third grader and a senior in high school do not seem equally
vulnerable. However, as the Tenth Circuit noted in Maldonado v.Josey, 975 F.2d 727
(10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1226 (1993): "[Y]ounger children are
incapable of providing for their own basic needs; they depend on parents or other
caretakers to provide for them. Even older children may beforced by school disciplinary
procedures and rules to rely on authority figures at school to protect them from
harm." Id. at 735 (emphasis added). While the distinction argued for in this
Comment may be instinctively more appealing when it involves abuse of young
children by their own school teacher, this Comment maintains that even older
children are faced with a unique set of difficulties when abused by an authority
figure, that they do not have to encounter with when abused by a peer. The
distinction should, therefore, not depend on the age of the student.
It is also arguable that "authority figures" is too broad a category if it includes
any school employee-for example, janitors and bus drivers. Again, the distinction
seems more appealingwhen cast as abuse bystudents compared to abuse by teachers.
However, the psychological research groups all adults in positions of authority
together for those purposes. As a point of fact, one of the most egregious cases of
abuse or molestation involved a bus driver. See Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985
F.2d 707, 708 (3d Cir. 1993) ("[P]laintiff schoolchildren allege that they were sexually
molested by their school bus driver while being driven in the bus to and from
school.").
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authoritative position-would not apply when students are abused by
other students.
CONCLUSION
This Comment suggests that courts should find an affirmative
duty in the public school setting at least in cases of abuse or
molestation by a teacher or school employee. In this group of cases,
the state has coerced the child/citizen into a situation where she is
particularly vulnerable to abuse by an authority figure, and faces
unique difficulties reporting such abuse. Therefore, applying an
affirmative duty would be consistent with the underlying principle
of affirmative duty doctrine, as discussed in Part I.
A court which finds a duty in cases where a teacher or school
employee is the perpetrator of the abuse is not necessarily obligated
to find that such a duty exists when a student is abused by a fellow
student. The "all or nothing" approach is not necessary. All of the
public school abuse cases are not the same. As noted, there is a
significant difference, with regard to vulnerability and ability to seek
assistance, between cases in which the perpetrator is a teacher or
school employee and cases in which the perpetrator is a student.
The middle ground delineated in this Comment provides an
opportunity for a court to leave the door to recovery at least
partially open, where it otherwise might have slammed it shut.
Given the destructive impact-physically and emotionally--of the
injuries suffered by these children, any proposal for preserving the
opportunity for a successful claim is essential.
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